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CORRECTION
Correction: Approach-Induced Biases in
Human Information Sampling
Laurence T. Hunt, Robb B. Rutledge, W. M. Nishantha Malalasekera, Steven W. Kennerley,
Raymond J. Dolan
In Fig 2, the title for panel C is incorrect. The panel title should read “Positive evidence
approach: MULTIPLY BIG minus MULTIPLY SMALL” rather than “Sampling the favorite:
MULTIPLY BIG minus MULTIPLY SMALL”. Please see the corrected Fig 2 here.
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Fig 2. Positive evidence approach bias at Task Stage 1. At Task Stage 1, subjects decide whether to make a guess
or pay 10 points to sample. The available card to sample may be on the same row (“AA trials”) or the opposite row (“AB
trials”) as the first card. (A) Model predictions. The relative expected value (in points) of guessing versus sampling from
the dynamic programming model in the MULTIPLY conditions. Mid-valued cards make it more valuable to sample,
whereas extreme-valued cards make it more valuable to guess. There is a weaker influence of the location of available
information (compare “AA trials” versus “AB trials”). Crucially, optimal behavior is identical for both MULTIPLY BIG and
MULTIPLY SMALL conditions. (B) Subject behavior. The probability of guessing in both conditions shows a broad
similarity to the predictions of the dynamic programming model, but behavior in MULTIPLY BIG and MULTIPLY SMALL
shows systematic differences. (See S1 Fig for AA and AB trials plotted together, rather than MULTIPLY BIG and
MULTIPLY SMALL.) (C) Positive evidence approach bias is revealed by subtracting the MUTLIPLY SMALL condition
from the MULTIPLY BIG condition. Subjects are more likely to guess early if they have seen evidence that supports
them approaching row A rather than avoiding it. This effect is strengthened in AB trials, in which subjects only have the
opportunity to sample further information about row B. See also S2 Fig and S3 Fig for other conditions. Data for
reproducing all analyses is freely available for download from Dryad.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.1002618.g001
PLOS Biology | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.1002618 November 30, 2017 2 / 2
